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Charting the Course of Commerce Clause
Challenge
Richard D. Friedman*
Recognizing Barry Cushman's formidable skills in both re-
search and argument, and his enormous wealth of knowledge, I
have long known that I would much rather be on the same side
of an issue with him than on the opposite side. And I am glad
that we have been on the same side of an important issue, for
both of us doubt that Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing plan
had much to do with the constitutional transformation of the
1930s. But now I have expressed disagreement with some
propositions he has asserted, and I have made some assertions
with which he disagrees, he has responded, and I will reply. In
view of the fact that Professor Cushman's "brief comment"' is
more than half again as long as my initial article, 2 I am afraid
that this essay will also be longer than that initial article. Hav-
ing just spent far more on an addition to our house than we spent
on the house itself, I will not complain.
Let me say right off: Professor Cushman's comment
makes some excellent points. It has caused me to reassess and
modify some assertions I made in my article and some assump-
tions I had held too easily for a long time. At the same time, for
all the archness of his tone and intensity of his comment he does
little or nothing to challenge the basic thesis of my article, that
though Congress's power under the Commerce Clause devel-
oped enormously in the first half of the twentieth century there
were no major discontinuities in the doctrine. Indeed, so far as I
understand it, he is in broad agreement with this thesis, at least
* Copyright © 2003 Richard D. Friedman. Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law,
University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104; (734) 647-1078.
1. Barry Cushman, Continuity and Change in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 55
ARK. L. REv. 1009, 1009 (2003) [hereinafter Cushman, Continuity and Change].
2. Richard D. Friedman, The Sometimes-Bumpy Stream of Commerce Clause Doc-
trine, 55 ARK. L. REv. 981 (2003) [hereinafter Friedman, Sometimes-Bumpy Stream].
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up to 1941. 3 And, as I will show below, some of his points ac-
tually strengthen my thesis. Most of his comments are ad-
dressed to particular assertions that I made along the way, often
drawing on an earlier article,4 in trying to explain how constitu-
tional doctrine changed. Although he has caused me to mod-
ify-and, I hope, refine and improve-my account in some par-
ticulars, I continue to believe the account is basically solid.
Especially given the extreme time pressure under which I
am writing this reply, I cannot hope to respond to every point
and implication of Professor Cushman's comment; I have had to
5pick my points. Because I am replying to selected points in a
comment that itself challenges selected points in my article, this
essay may have a scattershot quality. Accordingly, I will give a
brief overview of part of our disagreement. I regard the climac-
tic moment in the development of Commerce Clause doctrine in
the New Deal to be the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,6 in which Chief Justice Hughes,
writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, established that
Congress may regulate productive activities, so long as they
have a sufficient relationship to interstate commerce, without
having to show the intent of the persons regulated to interfere
with commerce. Hughes's opinion altered previous doctrine, but
it was consistent with, and a natural outgrowth of, basic princi-
ples that he had previously articulated. Later decisions, notably
United States v. Darby7 and Wickard v. Filburn,8 extended Jones
& Laughlin-Darby, decided shortly before Hughes's retire-
ment, pushed the doctrine out about as far as Hughes cared to
take it-but built on the framework it had laid out. Professor
Cushman, as I understand it, sees Jones & Laughlin as an appli-
cation (though not explicit) of, or at least motivated by, the
3. See Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1009 (stating "we agree
that the development of Commerce Clause doctrine between 1890 and World War II was
marked by less discontinuity than is sometimes recognized").
4. Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The
Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1891 (1994) [here-
inafter Friedman, Switching Time].
5. I will be happy to communicate with anyone interested in knowing the extent to
which I agree or disagree with any points to which I do not reply here. I can be contacted
at: rdfrdman@umich.edu.
6. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
7. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
8. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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"stream of consciousness" doctrine. I believe he regards Darby
and Wickard as the more significant developments, though with
respect to Darby he appears to regard only the application of
general principles to the case, and not Justice Stone's articula-
tion of those principles, as particularly significant.
In Part I of this essay, I address Professor Cushman's criti-
cism of my discussion of the nineteenth-century precedents. In
Part 1I, I discuss three strands of early twentieth-century doc-
trine. In explaining Jones & Laughlin, I give less weight than
does Professor Cushman to either the overthrow in Nebbia v.
New York 9 of the "affected with a public interest" doctrine or to
the "stream of commerce" theory. And I give more weight than
he does to the doctrine of the Shreveport Rate Cases Ias later re-
fashioned in Stafford v. Wallace.1 1 Finally in Part III, I discuss
five crucial New Deal cases.
I. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY PRECEDENTS
Professor Cushman begins his chain of disagreements with
me with my discussion of the nineteenth-century precedents. I
contended that in Gibbons v. Ogden12 John Marshall suggested,
albeit ambiguously, that "Congress may regulate a matter that is
not itself commerce, even though it may be characterized as an
'internal' concern of a state, if it affects other states in a suffi-
cient way."'1 3 Professor Cushman says he does not believe "that
there is anything in Gibbons that authorizes this inference."'
14
But I pointed to the famous passage in which Marshall distin-
guishes between "the external concerns of the nation, and...
those internal concerns which affect the States generally," as to
which federal power may be applied, and "those which are com-
pletely within a particular State, which do not affect other States,
and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of
executing some of the general powers of the government."' 5 It
9. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
10. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
11. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
12. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
13. Friedman, Sometimes-Bumpy Stream, supra note 2, at 984.
14. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1010.
15. Friedman, Sometimes-Bumpy Stream, supra note 2, at 983-84 (quoting 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 195).
2003] 1057
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is true, as Professor Cushman says, that given the factual setting
of Gibbons there was no need for Marshall to discuss what,
other than "commerce," the Commerce Clause might authorize
Congress to regulate. But necessity did not always confine Mar-
shall: he did include this passage, and the implication certainly
seems to be that a critical factor in determining the reach of fed-
eral power is the effect of the activity that Congress seeks to
regulate.
Professor Cushman contends that my "formulation suc-
ceeds in accommodating nearly two centuries of precedents only
by retreating to a level of generality at which the claim is so un-
controversial as to be unilluminating."' 16 I showed that Marshall
suggested, and later cases made clear, that Congress is not lim-
ited to regulating commerce itself, and that Congress can regu-
late matters that are not commerce so long as they have the req-
uisite effect on commerce. I do not understand Professor
Cushman to deny that this was orthodox law by the middle of
the nineteenth century. But he contends-and I do not dis-
agree-that the doctrine was not controversial and that it did not
determine results in twentieth-century cases; he asks, after de-
scribing an opinion by Justice Story that I quoted, "Should we
conclude from this that Story and his colleagues would have
voted with the majority in NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., or in United States v. Darby, or in Wickard v. Filburn?'
1 7
Of course, I suggest no such conclusion. I fear my position is
sufficiently vulnerable to misunderstanding that I had better try
to explain it again.
I do not contend that the proposition that Congress's power
to regulate commerce extends to matters that are not in them-
selves commerce but that sufficiently affect commerce was con-
troversial when it was established, or indeed at any later time. I
do not know to what extent the absence of controversy on this
point in Supreme Court decisions is attributable to the tendency
of justices at the time to suppress dissent and to what extent it
was attributable to their agreement that the proposition was sen-
sible, or at least to their lack of disagreement with it. I do con-
tend that there was an alternative way to read the language of the
16. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1011.
17. Id. at 1012 (footnotes omitted).
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Commerce Clause-as limiting Congress to regulating matters
that were themselves commerce-and that this alternative was
rejected well before the end of the nineteenth century.
Professor Cushman plainly does not disagree that the alter-
native was rejected. Perhaps he disagrees that the alternative
was intellectually plausible at all. But even if it was not-I be-
lieve it was, but I do not feel strongly on the point-it does not
undercut my thesis. I have argued that the development of
Commerce Clause doctrine has been devoid of major disconti-
nuities. I believe that the adoption of the effects doctrine was
the first step in the "sometimes-bumpy stream" that culminated
in the New Deal cases. If the effects doctrine was essentially
pre-ordained-by the language or structure of the Constitution,
or by the lack of any viable alternative, or by whatever-it
would simply mean that the first part of the stream was even
smoother (or perhaps shorter or less interesting) than I have sug-
gested.
Now, of course, I do not contend that one who adopted the
principles adopted in cases such as United States v. Coombs
18
and The Daniel Ball'9 thereby took a position that preordained
the New Deal cases. The whole point of my article was that
Commerce Clause doctrine changed enormously over time but
in generally small steps. I do believe that a series of forces
made it especially likely that, once the Court adopted the effects
principle, the doctrine would change in the direction eventually
achieved by the New Deal cases. But between the earlier cases
and the later ones lie the significant developments of several
decades.
II. THREE STRANDS OF DOCTRINE
A. The "Affected With a Public Interest" Doctrine
Professor Cushman invests Nebbia v. New York2' with
enormous significance. I agree that it is a case of great impor-
18. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838).
19. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871).
20. Had the Court not adopted that principle, the eventual outcome may have been
much the same, but presumably by a different-and much less continuous-course, per-
haps involving a constitutional amendment.
21. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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tance, but not to the extent that Professor Cushman does; I do
not believe that the advances in Commerce Clause doctrine de-
pended on the decision in Nebbia, though they may well have
depended on the type of thinking that underlay Nebbia. I said in
a footnote in my article that NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.22 "did not depend on the overthrow, in [Nebbia] of the
'affected with a public interest' doctrine; neither Nebbia nor that
doctrine were cited in the majority opinion or in the dissent in
Jones & Laughlin, which was not a price-regulating case.",
23
Professor Cushman disagrees at some length. I am not sure the
matter has any substantial bearing on the principal thesis of my
article, concerning the development of Commerce Clause doc-
trine. But it has significance of its own, and so I will reply.
Professor Cushman says that I err in assuming "that the af-
fected with a public interest doctrine applied only to price-
regulation cases." 24 I did not assume that. The term "affected
with a public interest" had different meanings in different con-
texts. Although some judicial expressions seem to assume that
businesses that were not characterized in this way could not be
subjected to regulation at all, the more realistic view was that
expressed by Chief Justice Taft in Charles Wolff Packing Co. v.
Court of Industrial Relations:25
All business is subject to some kinds of public regulation,
but when the public becomes so peculiarly dependent upon
a particular business that one engaging therein subjects
himself to a more intimate public regulation is only to be
determined by the process of exclusion and inclusion, and
to gradual establishment of a line of distinction.
26
Moreover, Taft indicated, characterization as a business clothed
with a public interest was not a binary matter:
The extent to which an inn or a cab system may be regu-
lated may differ widely from that allowable as to a railroad
22. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
23. Friedman, Sometimes-Bumpy Stream, supra note 2, at 988 n.25 (citation omitted).
24. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1019.
25. 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
26. Id. at 538-39. An earlier passage in Taft's opinion suggested that when a private
business was not affected with a public interest it enjoyed "freedom from regulation," id. at
536, but the formulation quoted in the text is, as Robert Post has noted, the more careful
one. Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court
Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1517 (1998).
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or other common carrier.... The extent to which regula-
tion may reasonably go varies with different kinds of busi-
ness. The regulation of rates to avoid monopoly is one
thing. The regulation of wages is another. A business may
be of such character that only the first is permissible, while
[with respect to another] ... both come within the public
concern and power of regulation.
27
When the Court in this era dealt with attempts to regulate
prices, including wages, it considered whether the particular in-
dustry should be considered affected with a public interest, and
in this context the term was given a very restrictive meaning.
28
In other contexts, where due process challenges to regulations or
taxes were raised, the Court usually asked the broader question
whether the statute was unreasonable or arbitrary; 29 sometimes
the Justices used the term "arbitrary or capricious."
30
In Nebbia, Justice Roberts's opinion for the majority re-
viewed at great length the breadth of regulation that was permis-
sible for the general welfare. 31  It then rejected the principle
"that there is something peculiarly sacrosanct about the price
one may charge for what he makes or sells." 32  The standard
governing the validity of price regulation-and, he maintained,
the standard that had governed the determination of whether a
given industry was affected with a public interest-was the or-
dinary one of due process, whether the laws were "arbitrary in
their operation and effect.
33
Now, let us look at the labor cases that preceded Jones &
Laughlin. The two principal cases invalidating statutes that pro-
27. Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 539.
28. See, e.g., Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 355 (1928); Tyson & Bros. v. Banton,
273 U.S. 418 (1927); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). I believe that Pro-
fessor Cushman overstates the narrowness of the category. Compare to his discussion at
Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note I, at 1017-18, the more expansive and looser
description in Tyson & Bros., 273 U.S. at 430, which, like Wolff Packing, 262 U.S. at 538,
admits considerable difficulty in defining the term. But the category was certainly narrow.
29. Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924).
30. E.g., id at 519-20 (Brandeis, J., dissenting, joined by Holmes, J.); Truax v. Corri-
gan, 257 U.S. 312, 329 (1921); New York ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall,
245 U.S. 345, 350 (1917); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 30 (1915) (Day, J., dissenting,
joined by Hughes, J.).
31. 291 U.S. at 525-30.
32. Id. at 532.
33. Id. at 537.
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hibited "yellow dog" contracts, Adair v. United States34 and
Coppage v. Kansas, 5 both involved railroads. That the business
involved in these cases was the classic one deemed "affected
with a public interest" did not save the statutes; the majority of
the Court in each case held that the statute violated the freedom
of contract of the parties to the contract. Hughes dissented in
Coppage, which was decided during his first judicial tenure.
Shortly after he became Chief Justice, he had a chance to revisit
the issue, in Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood
of Railway and Steamship Clerks.36 That case involved a provi-
sion of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 that, without terms pro-
hibiting contracts of any form, forbade covered employers to in-
terfere with employees' self-organization or designation of
representatives. For a unanimous Court (McReynolds not par-
ticipating), Hughes spoke favorably about Congress's power to
"safeguard" the employees' right of collective action. He held
that Adair and Coppage were "inapplicable" because "[t]he stat-
ute is not aimed at [the] right of the employers [to select or dis-
charge employees] but at the interference with the right of em-
ployees to have representatives of their own choosing., 37 This,
as Professor Cushman has written, "was a distinction that could
be remembered just long enough to be stated once. 38
I think it could not be surprising, then, that in Jones &
Laughlin, confronting a statute that had a broader scope than
that of the Railway Labor Act but that protected associational
rights in a similar way, Hughes spoke of the employees having a
"fundamental right" to organize, 39 or that he rejected the em-
ployers' reliance on Adair and Copage with little more than a
citation to Texas & New Orleans, or that he characterized the
regulation in traditional terms as not being "arbitrary or capri-
cious." 41 Had he regarded the doctrinal transformation achieved
by Nebbia as a critical element in the case, whether to the out-
34. 208 U.S. 161(1908).
35. 236 U.S. 1.
36. 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
37. Id. at571.
38. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 126 (1998) [hereinafter
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING].
39. 301 U.S. at 33.
40. Id. at 45.
41. Id. at 44.
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come or to the mode of analysis, one would have expected him
to cite the case.42 That is not to deny that a justice who rejected
the principle of Nebbia-who regarded governmental power
over price regulation and other limited matters as confined to a
closed set of businesses affected with a public interest-and
who further regarded a prohibition of interference with associa-
tional rights as one of those limited matters, would reject the ex-
pansion of Texas & New Orleans to an industry he did not con-
sider affected with a public interest; that is, I suppose, almost
tautologically true.43 But the Justices who formed the majority
in Jones & Laughlin did not fit this description, and I believe the
actual articulation in Nebbia reflected rather than transformed
their thinking.44
To put the point simply, suppose that the Court decided
Jones & Laughlin before, rather than after, Nebbia. There is no
reason to suppose that Hughes's opinion in Jones & Laughlin
would have been written any differently. At the same time, I
readily acknowledge that any Justice who, in this thought ex-
periment, joined the majority in Jones & Laughlin would be
logically expected to join the majority in the hypothetical later-
42. He cited Nebbia repeatedly in his dissent in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Ti-
paldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (Hughes, J., dissenting), and, two weeks before Jones &
Laughlin, in his majority opinion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Both cases involved wage regulation, a form of price regulation.
43. Thus, the four conservative members of the Court objected to the expansion. As
Professor Cushman points out, the dissent by Justice McReynolds, joined by the other
three, distinguished Texas & New Orleans as limited to common carriers. Jones & Laugh-
lin, 301 U.S. at 101 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). Given that the dissent relied on Adair
and Coppage, which also involved common carriers, and made no attempt to distinguish
them from Texas & New Orleans, it seems virtually to reject that case. Perhaps a sense of
comity caused the other three Justices to go along with McReynolds's dissent without ob-
jecting to this treatment of a precedent in which they had joined. Correspondingly, as Pro-
fessor Cushman points out, neither McReynolds nor any of the other three objected to the
application of the National Labor Relations Act to an interstate coach carrier, in Washing-
ton, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937); here it may have been
McReynolds who chose not to break the lockstep. The chain of decisions still leaves at
least Justice Van Devanter something of a mystery, because he had voted with the majority
in Coppage.
44. Note, for example, Justice Stone's dissent, joined by Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. at 359 (Stone, J., dissenting), and Brandeis's
opinion for the majority-the same majority as in Nebbia, except for the inclusion of
Holmes rather than his successor Cardozo-in O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire In-
surance Co., 282 U.S. 251(1931). Both, I believe, go far in the direction of Nebbia.
2003] 1063
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decided Nebbia. I therefore doubt that there is a large difference
between Professor Cushman and me on this matter.
B. The Stream of Commerce
Professor Cushman contends that I understated the strength
of the "stream of commerce" doctrine as it stood on the thresh-
old of the New Deal cases. He may be right. If he is, this only
strengthens my thesis that the development of Commerce Clause
doctrine has not been marked by major discontinuities. At the
same time, I continue to believe the "stream of commerce" doc-
trine did not have as much force as Professor Cushman con-
tends, or the power he attributes to it for explaining the Supreme
Court's willingness to uphold the application of the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Wagner Act") in Jones &
Laughlin and its companion cases.
Professor Cushman relies on Stafford v. Wallace,45 as did
the Government in Jones & Laughlin. For now, I will consider
Stafford in the way that it has usually been understood, as a
"stream of commerce" case; in Section C, I will address another
aspect of the case. Professor Cushman is correct that the case
was useful for the Government in Jones & Laughlin, for it spoke
about the "flow of live stock.., through the great stockyards
and slaughtering centers" on the borders of the West and South-
west, a flow that began with livestock and ended with "meat
products or stock for feeding and fattening.
4 6
But notice several points. First, though the statute, the
Packers and Stockyards Act, 192 1,47 regulated meat packers, it
did not, as I understand it, regulate their productive activity.
Rather, it regulated transactions by them that were deemed to be
in commerce.
Second, Taft gave no indication that it would be permissi-
ble for Congress to regulate a productive process in which goods
came to rest and were materially transformed. On the contrary,
he emphasized continuity:
The stockyards are not a place of rest or final destination.
Thousands of head of live stock arrive daily by carloads
45. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
46. Id. at 514, 516.
47. Packers and Stockyards Act, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159 (1921).
1064
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and trainload lots, and must be promptly sold and disposed
of and moved out to give place to the constantly flowing
traffic that presses behind. The stockyards are but a throat
through which the current flows, and the transactions which
occur therein are only incident to this current from the West
to the East, and from one state to another. Such transac-
tions cannot be separated from the movement to which they
contribute, and necessarily take on its character.... The
sales are not, in this aspect, merely local transactions. They
create a local change of title, it is true, but they do not stop
the flow; they merely change the private interests in the
subject of the current, not interfering with, but, on the con-
trary, being indispensable to, its continuity.
Third, later cases read Stafford with this emphasis on conti-
nuity, and not as a production case. For example, Industrial
Ass 'n v. United States49 concerned an agreement restraining
trade in building materials. Among the materials covered was
plaster that had come from out of state. Nevertheless, the Court
held that because the agreement covered only plaster that "pre-
viously had been brought into the state and commingled with the
common mass of local property," its "interstate commercial
status had ended., 50  The case was therefore "utterly unlike"
Swift & Co. v. United States51 and Stafford. In Swift, "the only
interruption of the interstate transit of live stock" was "that nec-
essary to find a purchaser at the stockyards" and in Stafford,
"which likewise dealt with the interstate shipment and sale of
live stock," the stockyards, were "described, not as a place of
rest or final destination, but as 'a throat through which the cur-
rent flows,' and the sale as only an incident which does not stop
the flow but merely changes the private interest in the subject of
the current without interfering with its continuity."52 It is true,
as Professor Cushman points out, that in Industrial Ass 'n there
was no further interstate movement contemplated after produc-
tion, but that does not nullify the fact that the Court treated Swift
and Stafford as cases depending on continuity. And certainly
48. Stafford, 258 U.S. at 515-16.
49. 268 U.S. 64 (1925).
50. Id. at 78-79.
51. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
52. 268 U.S. at 78-79.
2003] 1065
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Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,53 treated the cases that way, saying,
"The sales [in Swift and Stafford] which ensued merely changed
the private interest in the subject of the current without interfer-
ing with its continuity."
54
Fourth, consider Professor Cushman's contention that
"lawyers for the NLRB were confident that the stream of com-
merce doctrine could be employed to uphold application of the
Wagner Act to manufacturing concerns that took in raw materi-
als from outside the state and then shipped finished products in
interstate commerce," and that this confidence "formed the basis
of the NLRB's litigation strategy in selecting appropriate test
cases." 55 It appears to me that Peter Irons's account, on which
Professor Cushman relies, cuts the other way. According to
Irons, an NLRB memo identified various considerations govern-
ing the selection of test cases. One of these was the type of in-
dustry. The best type of industry was one in which most of the
employees were actually engaged in interstate commerce, such
as trucking and bus lines. As Irons reports:
The "next best" industries identified in the memo
were those in which the employees worked on products in
the "current" of commerce, which came into and emerged
from a state "essentially unchanged in character." This
category would include stockyards, meatpackers, and grain
elevators, defense of congressional regulatory power would
rest on such expansive commerce clause cases as Stafford
v. Wallace and Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, which
dealt with just these industries. Following these as the
"third best" category were those manufacturing industries
constituting the bulk of the Board's jurisdiction, those in
which "a substantial part of the raw materials flow from
other states into the manufacturing plant and a substantial
part of the resulting products flow out from the plant to
other states. The more important the industry to the na-
tional economy, and the more dispersed its collection and
distribution of goods, the better; autos, steel, textile, and
rubber "are the best of this class," followed by clothing,
metal fabrication, chemical, paper, and similar industries.
53. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
54. Id. at 305 (citing Indus. Ass 'n, 268 U.S. at 79).
55. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1028.
56. PETER IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 241-42 (1982).
1066
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These "third best" industries, among which particularly attrac-
tive candidates were the productive industries involved in the
cases brought to the Supreme Court, were therefore regarded as
quite distinct from "stream of commerce" industries, regulation
of which would be supported by cases like Stafford.57
Finally, so far as I am aware, no judge that considered the
applicability of the NLRA to productive industries indicated that
it should be upheld on the basis of the "stream of commerce"
theory. Several lower courts considered the argument, and each
rejected it with dispatch. The cases included ones in which in-
puts came to the manufacturing plant from other states and fin-
ished products were sold to other states.58 In such a case, there
were two streams of commerce, one ending at the manufacturing
plant, the other beginning after manufacture, but production was
a part of neither. 5  The cases emphasize transformation of the
materials and interruption of transit.
60
57. After the decision in Carter Coal, which Irons reports as having a "devastating"
effect on NLRB lawyers, the Board instructed its regional directors to discourage cases
involving manufacturing concerns. Id. at 252. But Charles Fahy, general counsel to the
Board, favored a strategy in which the Board would "present a 'package' of cases testing
the broadest range of the Board's powers," rather than approaching the Court first with the
strongest case on the interstate commerce question, and the package that he initially pro-
posed to the Board closely resembled the one that eventually reached the Court. Id. at 267.
58. See Foster Bros. Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1936); Bendix Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Beman, 14 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Ill. 1936); Stout v. Pratt, 12 F. Supp. 864 (W.D.
Mo. 1935), aff'd, 85 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1936); United States v. Weirton Steel, 10 F. Supp.
55 (D. Del. 1935). Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. Meyers, 15 F. Supp. 915 (D. Mass.
1936), and perhaps other cases as well, presumably also fits this description. Though the
Bethlehem court noted that the company "fabricates substantially all materials used in the
building of vessels," id. at 916, 1 assume that many of the raw materials came from outside
Massachusetts, the state of its plant. Both Bethlehem and Bendix cited Arkadelphia Milling
Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co., 249 U.S. 134 (1919), in support of their conclu-
sion that the productive activities were not in the stream of commerce. Professor Cushman
takes me to task for relying on Arkadelphia, a Dormant Commerce Clause case that in-
volved manufacture of raw materials that had not yet moved in interstate commerce.
Without reviewing the argument in detail, I believe that the citation of Arkadelphia in
Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 306, suggests that the factors I have emphasized-transformation
of the product and a considerable interruption in transit-were, in the contemporary view,
inconsistent with the stream of commerce. And the citation of Arkadelphia by these two
lower courts appears to bear me out.
59. The response of the court in Stout to the "stream" argument is indicative:
The contention is untenable and may be disposed of in a paragraph. That is not a
stream of commerce which begins in Kansas with the purchase of wheat in that
state for transportation to a Missouri mill, which is interrupted by the delivery of
the wheat at the Missouri mill where flour is manufactured from the wheat, and
which ends in Iowa with the sale and delivery there of flour, a new product, a
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And in the Supreme Court, the "stream of commerce" ar-
gument failed to persuade any of the conservative foursome, in-
cluding Van Devanter, who had joined Taft in Stafford, or But-
ler, who was not on the Court for Stafford but joined in Board of
Trade v. Olsen.61 Hughes's opinion for the majority, after sum-
marizing the argument on both sides, explicitly refused to place
the decision on "stream of commerce" grounds, saying that
"[t]he instances in which that metaphor has been used are but
particular, and not exclusive, illustrations" 62 of congressional
power: "The congressional authority to protect interstate com-
merce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to transac-
tions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of
interstate or foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions may
be due to injurious action springing from other sources. 63 Nev-
ertheless, Professor Cushman believes the "stream of com-
merce" theory likely accounts for Justice Roberts's joining the
majority, and he seems at least to entertain the possibility that
product different from the wheat which was shipped out of Kansas. Here are
two distinct streams of commerce, one ending when the wheat is unloaded at the
mill, the other beginning when the flour into which the wheat has been manufac-
tured is loaded on cars for shipment to Iowa. The mill is at the end of one of
these streams and at the beginning of the other, but it is a part of neither. In
every opinion of the Supreme Court in which the phrase "stream of commerce"
has been used, it has been used to describe a situation in which the thing moving
in commerce, as cattle, as grain, has been the same at the beginning and at the
end of the journey.
12 F. Supp. at 868.
60. See, e.g., Weirton Steel, 10 F. Supp. at 90 ("No ore, coal, limestone, or scrap iron
is shipped out into interstate commerce. What is shipped out are things entirely different
from the raw materials shipped in. The finished products are produced by extended manu-
facturing operations involving mechanical, chemical, and electrolytic processes."); Bendix,
14 F. Supp. at 65 ("We do not find.., raw materials being gathered together, some from
within and some from without the state, and by the application of a large amount of labor,
of relatively great value as compared with the value of the raw materials, converted into
finished products, consisting of complicated mechanisms .... ").
Some courts rejected the "stream" argument with little or no discussion. Foster Bros.,
85 F.2d 984; NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 85 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1936);
Oberman & Co. v. Pratt, 16 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Mo. 1936); El Paso Electric Co. v. Elliott,
15 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Tex. 1936); Remington Rand, Inc. v. Lind, 16 F. Supp. 666
(W.D.N.Y. 1936).
61. 262 U.S. 1 (1923). Thus, they disappointed Charles Fahy, who apparently had
hoped that those earlier votes presaged votes to uphold the NLRA. CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING, supra note 38, at 165. We have here a warning against putting too much
weight on the hopes and wishful thinking of advocates.
62. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36.
63. Id.
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"stream of commerce" thinking accounted for Hughes's vote as
well.64 I believe that Hughes should be taken at his word, espe-
cially given that the following year, in Santa Cruz Fruit Packing
Co. v. NLRB, 6 5 responding to the argument that productive activ-
ity (here not involving the use of raw materials imported from
other states) was not part of the stream of commerce, he re-
peated the key language from Jones & Laughlin-the stream of
commerce is only a metaphor, a particular and'non-exclusive il-
lustration of the Rower of Congress to protect commerce from
whatever source. As for Justice Roberts, given that he con-
cuffed silently in Carter Coal, Jones & Laughlin, and Santa
Cruz, inference is more difficult. Professor Cushman has articu-
lated a logically coherent view reconciling his votes in the three
cases. I suppose it is possible that Roberts navigated this path,
though it would mean that in the latter two cases his vote was
determined by factors that were distinctly at odds with the opin-
ions he was joining (not an impossibility).67 But just because
one can articulate a coherent view that would reconcile Rob-
erts's votes does not mean that Roberts actually took that view.
He may have had some other view that, at least to him, appeared
coherent.68 And, as I think most probable, he may have changed
his view. Certainly at some point Roberts became willing to act
on a theory broader than the "stream of commerce" rationale,
and I think the most probable time is when he signed onto a ma-
jor opinion expressly disclaiming reliance on that rationale. 69
64. If this is not so with respect to Hughes, I am not sure how Professor Cushman
accounts for Hughes's conduct. He says that he believes that Hughes's stance in Carter on
the labor provisions, which he regards as being indistinguishable from that of the majority,
is consistent with his position in Jones & Laughlin, but the "stream of commerce" theory
is, so far as I understand it, the only basis that he offers to reconcile the two.
65. 303 U.S. 453 (1938).
66. Id. at 464.
67. See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 38, at 183. Professor Cushman says that
the activities involved in Santa Cruz were not really productive, and I have no reason to
doubt him-but certainly Hughes's opinion treated them as if they were.
68. In Friedman, Switching Time, supra note 4, at 1968 n.393, I discuss two grounds,
in addition to the "stream of commerce" theory, that were offered to distinguish Jones &
Laughlin from Carter Coal. Paul Freund regarded one of them as plausibly explaining
Hughes's votes.
69. t do not think much reliance should be placed on the numerous expressions that
Professor Cushman has assembled describing Jones & Laughlin with the term "stream of
commerce" or similar language. This includes Roberts's own statement, made in 1949 and
quoted by Professor Cushman in Rethinking the New Deal Court, that a strike localized in a
HeinOnline  -- 55 Ark. L. Rev.  1069 2002-2003
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1055
C. Shreveport and Stafford
Professor Cushman believes I over-read The Shreveport
Rate Cases.70 I relied on Justice Hughes's opinion for the Court
primarily as demonstrating that congressional regulation of an
intrastate matter could be justified by an economic effect that the
matter had on interstate commerce, or on its regulation. My use
of the term economic effect was rather loose. I probably should
define it to mean an effect that is neither physical nor intended,
for running alongside Shreveport was the general doctrine that
Congress could regulate matters that were not commerce but
that had a "direct effect" on commerce. Traditionally, such mat-
ters were typically physical obstructions, but there was also a
well-established line of cases, which arose frequently with re-
spect to the Sherman Act, that even disputes in productive in-
dustries could be reached if the effect on interstate commerce
was "direct," direct being a synonym in this context for "in-
tended.",
7 1
In describing Shreveport, I quoted the key passage in which
Hughes discusses the scope of federal power, but did not em-
phasize-as Professor Cushman does, and as I should have
done-that it addresses the extent to which Congress may regu-
late the intrastate operations of "interstate carriers"; on its face,
the opinion said nothing about congressional power over intra-
state matters other than the activities of interstate carriers, which
were the entities involved in the case. Outside that context, it
given community may interfere with "the flow of goods to and from that community."
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 38, at 173. It is easy to slip into terms like these even
when referring to the effect that activity not deemed to be in commerce has in obstructing
commerce. Jones & Laughlin was very clear that it was based on the perception that the
regulated activities obstructed commerce, not on the perception that those activities were so
much a part of the flow of commerce that they should be deemed to be in commerce. And
in case there was confusion, Santa Cruz repeated the point.
70. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
71. See, e.g., United Leather Workers Int'l Union, Local 66 v. Herkert & Meisel
Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924) Specifically the Court stated,
It is only when the intent or the necessary effect upon such commerce in the arti-
cle is to enable those preventing the manufacture to monopolize its supply or
control its price, or discriminate as between its would-be purchasers, that the
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left standing the traditional doctrine, based on physical and in-
tended effects.
This is a fair point. Note at the outset that it does not sub-
stantially alter my thesis about the relatively continuous devel-
opment of Commerce Clause doctrine. As I said in my article,
Shreveport was an advance over prior cases in allowing an eco-
nomic impact on commerce to justify a regulation of intrastate
matters, but it was an advance that fit well with those cases.
That the advance was, on its face, limited to the operations of in-
terstate carriers emphasizes the continuity of Shreveport with the
prior cases. Looking forward, the same fact also emphasizes
that there was a significant step to be taken between Shreveport
and the New Deal cases that allowed Congress to regulate intra-
state activities in general because of their impact on commerce.
But of course, that point fits perfectly well with my thesis. I
have presented Jones & Laughlin as applying Shreveport-style
thinking to productive industries. I have not suggested that
Jones & Laughlin was not an advance in Commerce Clause doc-
trine-indeed, I regard it as more of an advance than Professor
Cushman does-but only that it was a natural development of
well-established doctrine.
But, given that the language of Shreveport was limited to
interstate carriers, of what possible significance can it be in ex-
plaining Jones & Laughlin? I think the key is that the doctrinal
lines that emerge-that Congress may regulate the intrastate op-
erations of interstate carriers if they have a substantial impact on
interstate commerce, including an economic one, but that Con-
gress can regulate other intrastate matters only if they have a
physical or intended impact-are rather frail. That does not
mean that a justice could not adhere to those lines, and perhaps
the conservative Justices-including Justice Van Devanter, who
as Professor Cushman points out, joined the majority in Shreve-
port and was one of the dissenters in Jones & Laughlin-
continued to do so. But clearly such doctrinal lines would be
under great pressure. Given that economic impact of intrastate
operations on interstate commerce justifies congressional regula-
tion in the context of interstate carriers, and given that Congress
may protect interstate commerce "whatever may be the source
2003] 1071
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of the dangers which threaten it," 72 it is not a giant leap to say
that intrastate activities other than operations of interstate carri-
ers that affect interstate commerce substantially are subject to
congressional regulation, even though the impact is neither
physical nor intended.
Professor Cushman contends that the tension between these
doctrines was managed for decades. It is accurate enough to say
that the statements of general doctrine remained stable for some
time, but as Professor Cushman himself says, doctrine can be
stated in an innocuous way to paper over critical difficulties.
73
Intent being difficult to define with precision and difficult to de-
termine, I believe that standard was highly manipulable.74
Sometimes, as Professor Cushman now emphasizes, intent was
not found,75 and sometimes, as he has also emphasized, it was.76
He has shown very well that the standard was not applied with a
bias against labor unions to anywhere near the extent that has
sometimes been thought, 77 but that does not mean that the stan-
dard was predictable or coherent. If the impact of an activity on
interstate commerce was great, why should the intent of those
whose activities were in question be the measure of federal
power?
What I am suggesting is that the doctrinal lines governing
congressional power outside the context of interstate carriers
were under pressure, both from their own limitations and from
their juxtaposition next to the more flexible standards governing
carriers. Over time, therefore, it would appear likely that
72. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 317 (Hughes, J., separate opinion).
73. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1048.
74. See, e.g., Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107 (1933) (finding
that a boycott of a company engaged in fabrication of steel for interstate shipment had "a
purely local aim"); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925)
(holding that a mere reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped in interstate com-
merce by prevention of production is ordinarily remote obstruction, but when intent is to
restrain or control supply or price in interstate markets, then there is a direct violation).
75. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1038.
76. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of
Commerce Doctrine from Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 148
(1992) (noting that "the Sherman Act had been consistently and successfully applied to the
conduct of employees engaged in production where it had been shown that such conduct
was intended to restrain or control the supply of a product entering and moving in interstate
commerce").
77. Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1097-99 (2000) [hereinafter Cushman, Formalism and Realism].
1072
HeinOnline  -- 55 Ark. L. Rev.  1072 2002-2003
CHARTING THE COURSE
Shreveport-style thinking would expand beyond the realm of
carriers, so that Congress could regulate practices other than the
activities of carriers that had a sufficient (however character-
ized) impact on commerce, even of an economic nature. And I
believe that Stafford advanced the process.78
I have discussed Stafford, in accordance with the usual
treatment, as a "stream of commerce" opinion. But Robert Post
has recently made an important argument that casts a different
light on it. "Although Stafford is sometimes seen as merely an
extension of the 'current of commerce' approach of Swift & Co.
v. United States," Professor Post writes, "in fact it marked a sig-
nificant departure from Swift. ''79 While Swift concerned the in-
tent of individuals, he points out, Stafford involved the facial va-
lidity of a statute. Taft wrote that the reasonable fear by
Congress of a recurrent injury to commerce from action that
would be lawful and affect only intrastate commerce when con-
sidered alone could serve "the same purpose as the intent
charged in the Swift indictment to bring acts of a similar charac-
ter into the current of interstate commerce for federal re-
straint." 80 And then, in terms that were much quoted later and
that departed from "stream of commerce" language, he went on
to emphasize the importance of recurrence, and of Congress's
power to determine that a recurrent burden justifies legislative
action:
Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and
threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of in-
terstate commerce, is within the regulatory power of Con-
gress under the commerce clause, and it is primarily for
78. Professor Cushman says that I treat Shreveport in a way that is "not historical in
nature" because "[t]he historical question is not whether we can interpret the opinion in [a
given] way, but whether the opinion was so understood at the time," which I take to mean
the time that it was written. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1016. But
I do not think this argument pays full heed to what I was trying to accomplish in my article.
My main theme was the incremental steps by which Commerce Clause doctrine has devel-
oped. If a case was taken to mean something more some years after it was written than it
was understood to say when it was written, then that may be just the type of incremental
change I was discussing. And I believe that this, in essence, is eventually what happened
to Shreveport.
79. Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be "Revived"?, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1513, 1556 (2002).
80. Stafford, 258 U.S. at 521.
10732003]
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Congress to consider and decide the fact of the danger and
meet it.
81
Thus, says Professor Post, Stafford "was a significant departure
from the sensibility of E.C. Knight" in that it authorized con-
gressional regulation of matters that had previously been consid-
ered within state control, and that it deferred to Congress as to
when such regulation was justified.82 If Professor Post is right,
and it appears to me that he probably is, then the principal thesis
of my paper, concerning the absence of major discontinuities in
Commerce Clause doctrine, is strengthened. And beyond that, it
is notable that in this part of his argument Taft relies on, among
other cases, Shreveport and the Minnesota Rate Cases83 a con-
solidated case decided the year before Shreveport in which
Hughes, in the course of upholding state rate regulations and or-
ders, went rather out of his way to speak expansively about the
power of Congress to control intrastate transactions when such
control is incidental to the effective government of interstate
commerce with which such transactions have become "inter-
woven. ' 84 To be sure, Stafford, like Shreveport, involved an in-
dustry that was considered to be "affected with a public inter-
est," and Professor Cushman seems correct that this was a
significant factor governing decisions of the Taft era.85 But
Taft's statement of Congress's ability to prevent obstructions to
interstate commerce by regulating intrastate matters was stated
without qualification, not in such a way as to indicate a limita-
tion to such industries, and clearly was not limited to interstate
carriers. Thus, it appears that Stafford represents an expansion
of Shreveport-type thinking. 86 Moreover, it suggested an extent
81. Id.
82. Post, supra note 79, at 1558.
83. 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
84. id. at 399, quoted in Stafford, 258 U.S. at 522. Referring shortly after Hughes's
retirement as Chief Justice about the assertion of federal power in the Jones & Laughlin
case, the Attorney General, Francis Biddle, wrote that "this was not new ground for the
author of the Minnesota Rates Cases." Foreword, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1157, 1157-58
(1941).
85. See generally Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process
in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489 (1998).
86. 1 am not sure on what basis Professor Cushman puts Stafford aside in claiming
that "every case following [Shreveport]... up to the mid-1930s involved regulation of...
railroads," Cushman, Formalism and Realism, supra note 77, at 1130-31, a claim that he
repeats in his comment on my article. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at
1074
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of deference to Congress that was not apparent in Shreveport.
As one might expect, the passage quoted above became a favor-
ite one for New Deal lawyers to quote-and in Jones & Laugh-
lin, Hughes quoted it as well.
Stafford co-existed for a time with the doctrine established
in antitrust cases that activities related to production could not
be regulated unless the impact on commerce was intended. But
if such activities were recurrent and threatened to obstruct inter-
state commerce, why could Congress not reach them without a
showing of intent to harm commerce?
III. THE NEW DEAL CASES
A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States87
In my article, I said that in Schechter, "Cardozo's concur-
rence, joined by Stone, indicated no significant disagreement
with Hughes's majority opinion, though Hughes (presumably to
accommodate the Court's conservative foursome) used the old-
fashioned direct-indirect language and Cardozo emphasized that
the matter was one of degree." 88 Professor Cushman's reply
persuades me that I should have dropped the adjective old-
fashioned and that I should have dropped, or at least softened,
the parenthetical clause and the similar reference later on to
Hughes having "used categorical language, probably to keep the
conservatives in line." 89 As Professor Cushman emphasizes, the
Court had not yet given general applicability to the "close and
substantial" language of The Shreveport Rate Cases.90 But there
was nothing in Hughes's opinion that was inconsistent with the
idea that the determination was a matter of degree. There was
nothing akin, for example, to Sutherland's statement in Carter v.
1016. Perhaps he is using a narrow definition of what it means to follow the case, but he
says that Railroad Commission v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 257 U.S.
563 (1922)-which Stafford clearly follows-follows Shreveport, and Stafford says the
same thing. Stafford, 258 U.S. at 522. (Moreover, Taft says that the principle of these
cases is clearly stated in the Minnesota Rate Cases.) If Professor Cushman has committed
an oversight, I followed him into it, see Friedman, Sometimes-Bumpy Stream, supra note 2,
at 988 n.25, because he does not often do so.
87. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
88. Friedman, Sometimes-Bumpy Stream, supra note 2, at 993-94.
89. Id at 996.
90. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
2003] 1075
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Carter Coal Co. 91 that "the matter of degree has no bearing upon
the question here." 92 Cardozo, as I have said, treated his concur-
rence as consistent with Hughes's opinion, 93 and even while
emphasizing the matter of degree, articulated his test in terms of
the hard words "immediacy" and "directness." 94  And when in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.95 Hughes himself as-
serted that "[t]he question is necessarily one of degree," 96 he did
so without casting doubt on Schechter; indeed, he cited
Schechter in the same paragraph.
I find it entirely plausible that Hughes would have pre-
ferred to include some language in his Schechter opinion that
spoke of the matter as one of degree, but that in the end he did
not do so out of deference to the conservatives. We know from
Jones & Laughlin that, at least two years later, Hughes looked
on the matter as one of degree, and we know from Carter Coal
that the conservatives did not. Professor Cushman is probably
right that Hughes had nothing to fear from the conservatives in
this case, though I am less certain than he. 97  But even apart
from this possibility, it was Hughes's practice to accept sugges-
tions on language from his colleagues to accommodate them,
even when he preferred his own phrasing. 98 If Hughes had spo-
91. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
92. Id. at 308 (1936). Hughes did say that the direct-indirect distinction "is clear in
principle," but in the same sentence he said that "[t]he precise line can be drawn only as
individual cases arise." Schechter, 295 U.S. at 546.
93. "As to this feature of the case, little can be added to the opinion of the court."
Schechter, 295 U.S. at 554 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
94. "To find immediacy or directness here is to find it almost everywhere." Id. (Car-
dozo, J., concurring). Cardozo further finessed the issue in his dissent in Carter Coal. 298
U.S. at 327-28 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
95. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
96. Id. at 37.
97. 1 do not find it implausible that Hughes feared the possibility of the conservatives
gaining the vote of Justice Roberts to hold the wage and hour provisions of the code invalid
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, an issue that Hughes explicitly de-
clined to reach. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 551. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934),
notwithstanding, Roberts continued to give considerable teeth to due process with respect
to economic regulation. Friedman, Switching Time, supra note 4, at 1929.
98. Many years ago, addressing Hughes's style generally, I wrote that Hughes was
willing to amend his own language, sometimes even at the expense of strict co-
herence, when necessary to gain consensus. In one case, for example, he
changed a phrasing that he thought gave "the true milk of the word," because
Frankfurter found it objectionable. Like Holmes, he said, he was amenable to
being "reasonably raped." "You are generous," Frankfurter responded, "in
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ken in terms of degree, some of the conservatives almost cer-
tainly would have objected, and in all probability Hughes would
have relented.
B. Carter v. Carter Coal Co.99
I referred to Hughes's separate opinion in Carter Coal as
"cryptic" and "mysterious."' 00 Professor Cushman rejects these
characterizations. I do not disagree particularly with his asser-
tion that the opinion was "a clear, straightforward statement of
orthodox doctrine."' 101 And yet I believe my description holds.
Perhaps that appears paradoxical; unfortunately, my explanation
requires some length.
Carter Coal involved challenges to the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935. The Act imposed a heavy sales tax
on bituminous coal but rebated ninety percent of it to operators
who accepted a code to be drawn from statutory specifications
by a national commission. One portion of the code governed la-
bor matters. It guaranteed the right to organize and bargain col-
lectively. One of the labor provisions, Part 111(g), allowed rep-
resentatives of specified percentages of operators and of miners
to negotiate wage and hours standards binding on all code mem-
bers. Another portion of the code, the marketing provisions,
provided for the regulation of prices of bituminous coal and pro-
hibited unfair methods of competition. Congress recognized
that the labor provisions were especially vulnerable constitu-
meeting difficulties of others, even though they may not commend themselves to
you."
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AS CHIEF JUSTICE, 1930-1941: THE
COMPLEXITIES OF MODERATION 147-48 (1978) (unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Oxford Uni-
versity) (citations omitted) (on file with author).
99. 298 U.S. 238.
100. Friedman, Sometimes-Bumpy Stream, supra note 2, at 994, 995. At one point, I
also referred to it as a concurrence; at most it was a partial concurrence.
101. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1034.
102. Professor Cushman criticizes me for shrugging Carter Coal aside without "under-
taking any sustained effort to explain it." Id at 1037. But I did undertake such an effort in
my 1994 article. Friedman, Switching Time, supra note 4, at 1962-66. I did not deem it
necessary to repeat the discussion in my article for this Symposium, and stated my conclu-
sion with explicit references to that portion of the earlier article. Friedman, Sometimes-
Bumpy Stream, supra note 2, at 995 & nn.56-57. Professor Cushman having caused me to
rethink the matter, I now include a further discussion, basically consistent with but some-
what moderated from the prior one.
10772003]
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tionally, and so it included an explicit severability clause, pro-
viding that the invalidation of any part of the statute would leave
the rest unaffected.
For the majority, Justice Sutherland held at length that the
labor provisions were not authorized by the Commerce Clause.
He then added more briefly that Part 111(g) was an improper
form of delegation violative of due process. 10 3 And then, in
what appears to be have been a ploy to gain Roberts's vote, he
held that notwithstanding the severability clause, the statute was
inseverable, thus holding it unconstitutional in its entirety with-
out considering the merits of the marketing provisions. Justice
Cardozo, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone, dissented, say-
ing that the Court's opinion "begins at the wrong end."'10 4 The
marketing provisions were constitutional, he concluded, and
they were clearly severable from the labor provisions. Thus, the
operators were under a duty to come under the code or pay the
penalty if they refused. Given this, and the fact that there was
no threat of enforcement of the labor provisions, or even any ap-
parent violation of them-"the complainants have been crying
before they are really hurt," he said°5-the suit was premature
so far as the labor provisions were concerned, and Cardozo care-
fully avoided expressing an opinion on their validity.
Now let us examine Hughes's opinion. He begins with a
paragraph expressing agreement with the majority on some pre-
liminary points, and also on the propositions that "production-
in this case mining-which precedes commerce is not itself
commerce" and that the power to regulate interstate commerce
"is not a power to regulate industry within the State."'0 6 Noth-
ing particularly surprising there. His second paragraph does not
purport to be reciting agreements with the majority. The first
two sentences, citing two important railroad cases, convey a
tone and substance altogether absent from Sutherland's opinion:
Congress has the power to protect commerce from injury, what-
ever the source of dangers,m7 and it can provide for the peaceful
103. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 310-12.
104. Id. at 341 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 317 (Hughes, J., separate opinion).
107. Id. (Hughes, J., separate opinion) (citing Mondou v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford R.R. Co. (Second Employers' Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1 (1912)).
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settlement of disputes that threaten the orderly conduct of inter-
state commerce.108 Then comes a "but," though as Professor
Cushman says it is an orthodox one-Congress may not use this
power as a "pretext" to regulate activities that affect interstate
commerce only indirectly, for otherwise, "the multitude of indi-
rect effects" would give Congress the ability to "assume control
of virtually all the activities of the people to the subversion of
the fundamental principle of the Constitution."'1 9 Having set up
standard doctrine on both sides, he then concludes his discussion
of the labor provisions-except for Part III(g)-with this asser-
tion:
If the people desire to give Congress the power to regulate
industries within the State, and the relations of employers
and employees in those industries, they are at liberty to de-
clare their will in the appropriate manner, but it is not for
the Court to amend the Constitution by judicial decision.1 10
Is that statement an expression of an opinion that the regulations
at issue in the case are unconstitutional? Perhaps, but it is not
entirely clear, certainly not as clear as a forthright assertion in
the form, "I conclude that this statute is invalid. . . ." The two
clauses of Hughes's sentence can each be read to assert truisms,
that the people can achieve the result they want and that the
Court cannot amend the Constitution. But even if Hughes's
statement is read as the equivalent of the forthright assertion, it
is missing a "because" clause. Having set up the general princi-
ples, he does not explain why, at the end of the day, the statute
at hand falls short constitutionally. Is it that although the statute
provides for the peaceful settlement of disputes threatening
commerce, the effect here-or of any statute regulating labor re-
lations in productive industry-is deemed indirect, and if so
why? If there is a per se rule, how does that square with the fact
that in some cases, where intent to obstruct commerce had been
found, the impact on commerce of labor disputes in production
was deemed direct. Is the explanation for unavailability rather
that the statute here should not be deemed to provide for the
108. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 317 (Hughes, J., separate opinion) (citing Tex. & New
Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. ofRy. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930)).
109. Id. at 317-18 (Hughes, J., separate opinion).
110. Id. at 318 (Hughes, J., separate opinion).
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peaceful settlement of disputes threatening commerce, but in-
stead to use that purpose only as a pretext for a general regula-
tion of labor relations in bituminous coal mining? Are we to
conclude that Hughes means only to be adopting the reasoning
of the majority, even though Hughes had asserted critical pro-
Government propositions that were not to be found in the major-
ity opinion (and even though, with respect to the question of de-
gree, Hughes expressed himself in flat opposition only a year
later)?
In the third paragraph, concentrating on Part III(g), Hughes
returns to explicit agreement with the majority. And now, in
contrast to the prior paragraph, he is forthright about the bottom
line, concluding that Part III(g) is "invalid upon three counts"; 11'
I think it is clear that he detested Part III(g).112  Two of his
grounds turn out to be an elaboration of the delegation argument
made by the majority-Hughes separates out the propositions
that the provision is improper delegation and that it violates due
process because it gives some parties the power to make rules
for others not party to their agreement. Relative to the whole
discussion of the labor provisions, Hughes focuses on these ar-
guments much more than does the majority. His third ground,
stated without elaboration, is that Part 111(g) "goes beyond any
proper measure of protection of interstate commerce and at-
tempts a broad regulation of industry within the State." 13
Hughes then goes on to argue, as did Cardozo, that the
marketing provisions are valid and that the two sets of provi-
sions are severable. Given this agreement, one might have ex-
pected him to follow Cardozo's line and conclude that he needed
only to address the marketing provisions, which were enough to
support the duty to come within the code or pay the penalty,
111. Id (Hughes, J., separate opinion).
112. Hughes had developed the delegation doctrine in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935), and in Schechter. Two days after the Carter Coal decision, Justice
Brandeis said of Hughes to Felix Frankfurter: "He is crazy about 'confiscation.' He has a
mania on the subject-driven by fear and that blinds his judgment, so that his very consid-
erable brains are not at work." Memorandum of Conversation with Brandeis (May 20,
1936) (Felix Frankfurter MSS, Box 38, on-file with Manuscript Division, Library of Con-
gress). Very likely Brandeis was referring to Hughes's objection to the procedures allowed
by Part 111(g), which Hughes might have thought were effectively confiscatory. If Brandeis
was not thinking about this, I am not sure why he expressed himself in this way at that
time.
113. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 318-19 (Hughes, J., separate opinion).
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treating the validity of the labor provisions as premature. Obvi-
ously, he did not do so. But neither did he challenge Cardozo's
argument on this score.
114
In short, Hughes's discussion of the Commerce Clause im-
plications of the labor provisions offers language that is less than
transparent for a vote that was not necessary to determine the
outcome of the case and on an issue that, so far as appears, he
need not have even addressed.
Now let us consider how Hughes treated Carter Coal af-
terwards. In Jones & Laughlin, as I have said, he made a pro-
nouncement flatly inconsistent with Carter Coal's crucial asser-
tion that the test of congressional power was not a matter of
degree; the question, he said, was "necessarily one of degree.'
1 15
Moreover, compare his treatment of Schechter and Carter Coal.
He distinguished Schechter, albeit rather conclusorily, by saying
that there the Court found the effect so remote as to be beyond
federal power, and that if immediacy or directness were found
there it would be found almost everywhere. 1 6 Hughes could
have dealt with Carter Coal in similarly conclusory terms if he
had been so inclined. Or he could have adopted any of the sev-
eral grounds of distinction offered by the Government, including
the "stream of commerce" argument.1 17  He did not do so.
1I
Rather, he said that Carter Coal was not controlling because
there
the Court was of the opinion that the provisions of the stat-
ute relating to production were invalid upon several
grounds,-that there was improper delegation of legislative
power, and that the requirements not only went beyond any
114. He did say at the outset of the opinion that "in view of the question whether any
part of the act could be sustained, the suits were not premature," id. at 317, but this conclu-
sion was perfectly consistent with Cardozo's argument. See id. at 339 (Cardozo, J., con-
curring) (arguing that if the Act were completely invalid, the operators might "resist the
onslaught of the collector as the aggression of a trespasser," but given that the validity of
the price provisions rendered "unreal" the "hypothesis of complete invalidity," there was
no need to reach the question of the validity of the labor provisions).
115. Jones &Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
116. Id. at 40-41.
117. See Friedman, Switching Time, supra note 4, at 1968-69 n.393.
118. Even in conference, Hughes apparently found no need to distinguish Carter Coal.
Id. at 1965 n.381.
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sustainable measure of protection of interstate commerce
but were also inconsistent with due process.19
In other words, what Carter Coal said about the commerce
power should not be taken seriously because it said other things
as well. This treatment quite clearly cut the legs out from under
Carter Coal,120 and four years later, as I will show below,
Hughes joined without difficulty in administering the final blow
to the case. 12 1 Note further that Hughes's description of Carter
Coal is a misstatement of the case. The delegation and due
process points-treated as parts of a whole by Sutherland's ma-
jority opinion and separated out only by Hughes-were applica-
ble only to Part 111(g); the commerce question was essential for
the holding that the other labor provisions were unconstitutional.
It is only in Hughes's opinion, and only if it is read in the rather
odd way that I have suggested is plausible, as not expressing an
ultimate opinion on the validity of the labor provisions other
than Part 111(g), that the commerce issue is not critical to a dec-
laration of invalidity. It is as though, in preparing his descrip-
tion of Carter Coal in Jones & Laughlin, Hughes turned back
not to the majority opinion but only to the third paragraph of his
separate opinion.
119. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 41.
120. Professor Cushman attributes considerable significance to the fact that, according
to him, seven cases continued to treat Carter Coal as if it were good law even after Jones
& Laughlin was decided. CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 38, at 180 n.14. One of the
seven cases he cites does not in fact mention Carter Coal. See United States v. F.W. Darby
Co., 32 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Ga. 1940). Another, decided only a week after Jones & Laugh-
lin, does not cite that case. See Currin v. Wallace, 19 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. N.C. 1937).
Some of the cases cited Carter Coal just for bland propositions. One, noted by Professor
Cushman, actually seems to have relied on it, but it does not consider the effect of Jones &
Laughlin on it. Another, Moore v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 90 F.2d 735 (7th Cir.
1937), does conclude that Carter Coal survives Jones & Laughlin, but it does not rely on
Carter Coal and, like all the other cases, it does not deal with Hughes's language address-
ing Carter Coal. Nor does it suggest that the cases are distinguishable on the basis of their
different postures under the "stream of commerce" doctrine. Given the hesitation of lower
courts to treat a Supreme Court decision as overruled until the Court itself flatly says some-
thing to that effect, I do not think these few cases are particularly significant. Professor
Cushman also cites seven cases that he says implicitly suggest or explicitly state that Jones
& Laughlin overruled Carter Coal. CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 38, at 180 n.13.
121. See infra notes 138-57 and accompanying text. I do not mean that United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the case that achieved this result, posed no difficulties for
Hughes-it clearly did-but only that this aspect of Darby did not.
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And so Hughes promptly walked away from Carter Coal.
The power and majesty, even passion, of his opinion in Jones &
Laughlin, and the forceful manner in which he delivered it
orally, 122 confirm that it expressed his deeply held views; Pro-
fessor Cushman and I are agreed at least that it did not reflect a
switch caused by political factors. All of this leaves me wonder-
'ing why the man who wrote as he did in Jones & Laughlin also
wrote the unusual separate opinion in Carter Coal less than a
year before. I have thought that the motivation for the Com-
merce Clause discussion may have been to ask the public to
consider changing the Constitution rather than blame the Court
if it did not like the Court's decisions-that the culmination of
his general discussion of the labor provisions may indeed have
been more a public plea than a statement of legal conclusion.
Hughes had made at least one such suggestion in the past,'123 and
the statement in Carter Coal got some public notice. 124  But I
readily acknowledge that this hypothesis is speculative. 125
122. Friedman, Switching Time, supra note 4, at 1963.
123. Id. at 1962-63.
124. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1936, at 17.
125. Whatever Hughes thought of the Carter Coal majority's Commerce Clause dis-
cussion, I am sure he did not feel it was as intolerable as the same Justices' decisions in
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), or Railroad Retirement Board
v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935), or for that matter their decision on the sever-
ability issue in Carter Coal. Accordingly, he was less likely than in those cases to write a
"blistering dissent[]." Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1034.
Professor Cushman discusses United States v. Butler, 298 U.S. 1 (1936), which I did
not address, in which Hughes voted with Roberts and the conservatives to invalidate the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. 1 have no doubt that Hughes regarded the Act as an
unconstitutional form of regulation, but the Government, as Professor Cushman notes, did
not defend the statute under the Commerce Clause. I agree with his suspicion that such an
argument, made in 1936, would have failed. As the NLRB lawyers perceived, some pro-
ductive industries were more attractive candidates than others for pioneering arguments
based on effects on commerce. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. The Court,
per Roberts, with the concurrence of Hughes and over the dissents of the two remaining
conservatives, upheld the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 under a commerce-based
argument. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939). That Act purported to regulate market-
ing rather than production, and this was the basis of Roberts's opinion; the dissenters were
probably right at least to the extent that, given that farmers raise tobacco, the crop involved
there, only for sale, the Act had the effect of limiting production.
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C. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 126
Much of my prior discussion has looked ahead to Jones &
Laughlin; I have discussed Professor Cushman's explanation for
the case, and I have looked at the treatment in it of Carter Coal.
Now I will give my own assessment of it.
I stated in my article that Jones & Laughlin "was what one
would have expected had Carter Coal not been decided the year
before, or at least if Schechter and Carter Coal had not been de-
cided in the two preceding years." 127 I probably should have
moderated the statement: Under the hypothetical assumptions,
the Jones & Laughlin decision probably would not have ap-
peared particularly surprising. I am hypothetically assuming
Carter Coal away because it seems to me clearly in conflict with
the Jones & Laughlin opinion. I need not so definitely assume
Schechter away because though Schechter pointed in the other
direction from Jones & Laughlin it was a different case, and it
certainly was perceived as different by a majority of the Court.
Even without relying on these assumptions, Professor
Cushman does not believe that the result in Jones & Laughlin
was very surprising, but he relies on the "stream of commerce"
argument I have discussed above. 128 He disagrees with my ar-
gument, which is based on a combination of the sensibility be-
hind Shreveport and the portion of Stafford v. Wallace' 29that fol-
lowed Shreveport together with a recognition that production
can have a substantial impact on commerce.
Stafford, I have argued above, loosened the limitations on
Shreveport. If activities related to production had a significant
and predictable effect in restraining commerce, then it would
appear reasonable to hold that Congress could regulate those ac-
tivities in protecting commerce.
In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,13 ° Hughes had
written: "When industry is grievously hurt, when producing
concerns fail, when unemployment mounts and communities
dependent upon profitable production are prostrated, the wells of
126. 301 U.S. 1.
127. Friedman, Sometimes-Bumpy Stream, supra note 2, at 996.
128. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1037-38.
129. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
130. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
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commerce go dry."' 13 1 As Professor Cushman says,' 32 this pas-
sage was not written in support of an exercise of federal power;
indeed, Hughes offered it in support of a cartel's antitrust de-
fense. But it reflects a belief that production and commerce are
tightly linked. 1
33
Professor Cushman makes an interesting argument. Three
of the four conservatives had concurred in Appalachian Coals.
(McReynolds, the old trust-buster, dissented.) They had also
signed on to the Shreveport doctrine; indeed, Justice Van
Devanter had been on the Court, and in the majority, in Shreve-
port itself. If I believe that Shreveport and Appalachian Coals
together suggest Hughes's support for the Government in Jones
& Laughlin, why do I not say the same about these three? And,
a related argument, if I believe that Jones & Laughlin did not
represent a sharp break for Hughes, why do I not say the same
thing about Roberts, for their records, according to Professor
Cushman, were similar in material respects. I have a few re-
sponses.
First, with respect to the "wells of commerce" passage in
Appalachian Coals, to the extent it has significance it is not as a
statement of doctrine, but as a reflection of the sensibility of the
author. That another Justice concurred in an opinion having this
language means very little.
Second, and more significantly, I believe that Hughes's
prior record was in fact significantly different in material re-
spects from those of the conservative four and of Roberts. As
compared to them, he was far more likely to support the validity
of governmental regulations, specifically regulations of labor re-
lations. 134 He was more likely to suport the exercise of federal
power under the Commerce Clause,' and specifically to protect
131. Id. at 372.
132. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1036.
133. The statement was invoked by Cardozo in Carter Coal in support of the exercise
of federal power. 298 U.S. at 331.
134. E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (Van Devanter in majority, Hughes in
minority); Morehead, 298 U.S. 587 (Roberts and the conservative four forming majority,
Hughes in dissent).
135. See Alton, 295 U.S. 330 (Roberts and the conservative four forming majority,
Hughes in dissent); Tex. & Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 289 U.S. 627 (1933). Profes-
sor Cushman is correct that Texas & Pacific is not a constitutional case, but it "severely
restricted the Interstate Commerce Commission's power to protect local ports against dis-
crimination by carriers." Friedman, Switching Time, supra note 4, at 1968.
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commerce by attempts to ensure labor peace. 136  It is true
enough, as Professor Cushman argues, that these cases raise sig-
nificantly different issues from those present in Jones & Laugh-
lin. But there tends to be a rather strong correlation of thought
on issues like these; I imagine that Professor Cushman, who has
written with great force about the necessity of recognizing "an
integrated web of constitutional thought," 13 7 agrees. And, more-
over, even on the particular issue of Congress's power to regu-
late labor relations in productive industries, I believe that there
is a significant difference in prior record: Roberts and the con-
servative four were in the majority in Carter Coal while Hughes
wrote a separate opinion that, whatever its motivation, was no-
tably different in substance and tone in its discussion of the la-
bor issues other than Part 111(g).
Finally, at least with respect to the question of Hughes ver-
sus the conservatives, it is ultimately not particularly important
whether there was a differential in their prior records making a
vote for the Government in Jones & Laughlin probable. In any
event, Hughes came out for the Government and the conserva-
tives did not. I have not argued that the development of Shreve-
port-style thinking, even together with recognition of the link
between production and commerce, mandated support for the
Government on the Commerce Clause issue. One could still
cling to the doctrinal categories and conclude that productive ac-
tivities could not be regulated by Congress absent an intent by
the regulated parties to impair interstate commerce. And so the
conservatives did. Hughes did not, and refusal to do so was a
natural development for someone of his views. Apparently no
one in the courtroom when he delivered his opinion could doubt
his deep sincerity.
D. United States v. Darby 138
Professor Cushman's discussion of Darby is devoted al-
most entirely to the question of Hughes's attitude towards the
case; he believes that I "underestimate[] the severity of
136. See Alton, 295 U.S. 330.
137. CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 38, at 6.
138. 312 U.S. 100.
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Hughes's struggle." 139 He says "it would be a mistake to con-
clude that the Commerce Clause issue did not trouble him
deeply."' 140 I agree with the latter point; I suggested no such
conclusion. In m' article, I said explicitly that Hughes found
the case difficult, a conclusion consistent with my discussion
of the case in 1994, in which, as Professor Cushman notes, I
speculated that had the membership of the Court not changed
since the spring of 1937 the case might have been decided
against the Government.
So this may appear to be a tempest in a teapot, but without
the turbulence. Nevertheless, I believe that trying to understand
Hughes's attitude in Darby is important because he was such a
crucial player in the Commerce Clause cases of the 1930s, and
Darby may shed light on his role in those cases. Hughes found
Darby difficult in part because the statute could be construed to
reach matters that had little impact on interstate commerce;
hence the "'little man with [a] mill' comment quoted by Pro-
fessor Cushman. 14 2 He was particularly concerned by the fact
that the statute reached employers engaged "in the production of
goods for commerce," but without defining the term. 143 Accord-
ing to Justice Murphy, the Chief Justice posed the following as
the first question raised by the case: "Is the statute too indefinite
to permit criminal prosecution and that is because of lack of
proper definition of for production. How could an employer be
advised. Would an employer know he was subjected to the
act?"'144 But Hughes never expressed any doubt about the basic
structure of the law as it had been developed in Jones & Laugh-
lin and subsequent cases. On the contrary, he set forth the doc-
trine in presenting the case at conference, explaining that while
production is not commerce it can have a sufficiently close im-
pact on commerce to justify congressional regulation.
139. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1046.
140. Id.
141. Friedman, Sometimes-Bumpy Stream, supra note 2, at 999-1000.
142. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1047 (quoting Conference
Notes, No. 82, United States v. Darby (Jan. 4, 1941) (Frank Murphy MSS, Reel 123, Bent-
ley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan)).
143. Conference Notes, No. 82, United States v. Darby (Dec. 21, 1940) (Frank Murphy
MSS, Reel 123, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan).
144. Id.
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Hughes passed when it came time to vote on Darby, but af-
ter Stone circulated his draft opinion, Hughes sent him a letter,
the first sentence of which I quoted in my article: "'You have
written a strong opinion, again setting forth with suitable elabo-
ration the general principles which we have held should govern
the exercise of the commerce power. ' ' ' 145 This suggests not only
Hughes's agreement with the theoretical basis of the opinion but
his sense that it did not represent a dramatic shift from prior law.
Professor Cushman regards this letter as of relatively little im-
portance, because "'general principles' do not decide concrete
cases.... The Court could achieve consensus on the general
principles of Commerce Clause jurisprudence only by papering
over abiding differences concerning the proper scope of their
application."' 146 I donot fully agree with the apparent implica-
tion of this argument. Of course, application is crucial, but
statements of general principles are important in setting out doc-
trine, and lower courts pay attention to what the Supreme Court
says as well as what it does. Part of what appears to me to be an
"elaboration" of "general principles" in Stone's opinion is the
passage in which, after stating that suppression of the production
of goods made for commerce under substandard conditions is a
valid means of protecting commerce, he says: "So far as Carter
v. Carter Coal Co. is inconsistent with this conclusion, its doc-
trine is limited in principle by the decisions under the Sherman
Act and the National Labor Relations Act, which we have cited
and which we follow.' ' ]4 7 Hughes posed no objection to this
coup de grace to Carter Coal. He was clear as to what still
bothered him about the case:
Of course, there is much that could be said with respect to
the indefiniteness of the present statute, as a criminal stat-
ute, because of the failure of Congress to define the phrase
"production for commerce". Congress gives a sweeping
definition of "production" and of "goods" but not of "pro-
ductionfor commerce."
145. Friedman, Sometimes-Bumpy Stream, supra note 2, at 1000 (quoting Letter from
Charles Evans Hughes to Harlan Fiske Stone (Jan. 27, 1941) (Harlan Fiske Stone MSS,
Box 66, on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Hughes's Let-
ter]).
146. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1048.
147. Darby, 312 U.S. at 123 (citation omitted).
1088
HeinOnline  -- 55 Ark. L. Rev.  1088 2002-2003
CHARTING THE COURSE
In attempting to give some appropriate content to this
loose phrase, I think that the test should be as objective as
possible and should not be centered on the mere intent or
expectation of the employer apart from the usual and nor-
mal course of business of actual transactions. 
148
And Hughes's suggestions were all directed toward that end. In
three places, he wanted to see the phrase "according to the nor-
mal course of his business" to characterize the shipment in
commerce of the producer's goods. (In one place, this was a re-
placement for "in the normal course of his business," which he
regarded as not as sharp; in the other two places, it appears that
the phrase was an addition.) Stone accepted these sugges-
tions. 149  Hughes also proposed deletion of a clause indicating
that the statute would apply "although, through the exigencies of
the business, the goods may not thereafter actually enter inter-
state commerce." I  That clause, he said, "starts a line of in-
quiry which is not necessary to suggest in the present case.,151
This proposal Stone did not accept, though he softened it
slightly by inserting "all of' before "the goods. 152 This incom-
plete response may account in large part for Hughes's tepid ac-
ceptance of the opinion: "I will go along with this." 53
Hughes raised no further objections to the opinion. He did
say, "Even with the best possible test, the statute is a highly un-
satisfactor one, but as it is a border line case I should prefer not
to write."S54  One way to read this sentence is to this effect:
"Even if we read the best possible test into the statute, the fact
that we have to work so hard to do so makes the statute highly
148. Hughes's Letter, supra note 145.
149. Darby, 312 U.S. at 112, 117, 118.
150. Hughes's Letter, supra note 145.
.151. Id.
152. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118.
153. Hughes's return of Stone's draft opinion of United States v. Darby (Feb. 3, 1941)
(Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Box 66, on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
Professor Cushman says he is "inclined to place very little weight" on Hughes's cheerful
acceptance of Stone's opinion in Darby's companion case, a civil one. Cushman, Continu-
ity and Change, supra note 1, at 1048 n.248. For the reasons he states I agree that not
much weight can be put on this, but I think it is worth something. Hughes did not need to
do anything but say he agreed. If he were as close to the edge with respect to the compan-
ion as he was with respect to Darby, he may not have been inclined to be as affirmative as
he was.
154. Hughes's Letter, supra note 145.
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unsatisfactory, and that makes the case a close one." An alterna-
tive reading would be: "Even if the statute articulated the best
possible standard, it would be broader than I think appropriate
and that (together with the fact that it is not in fact so articulate)
makes this a close case." Perhaps the second reading is plausi-
ble (though I wonder; if Hughes found the statute "highly unsat-
isfactory" in that it was constitutionally overbroad, and terribly
vague as well, one would not think he would regard the case a
borderline one in which he was ultimately willing to join in up-
holding the statute), but I think the first more likely captures the
essence of Hughes's thinking. On the first reading, Hughes
would readily accept a well-drafted statute that reached produc-
tion only when the goods moved in interstate commerce "ac-
cording to the normal course of business," and so adhered to
what he regarded as an appropriate constitutional standard. On
the second reading, even such a statute would create a difficult
constitutional issue for him-but not so much as to make the
case worse than a "border line" one or to cause him to vote to
invalidate the statute.
In sum: Of course, Hughes found Darby troubling. The
statute was so vague that unless subjected to a limiting instruc-
tion it would reach beyond what he considered to be Congress's
constitutional reach, and the necessity for that exercise left him
especially uneasy in a criminal case. The best construction
seems to be that he would have had little or no trouble with a
statute that was explicitly limited in scope to those producers
whose goods moved in interstate commerce according to the
normal course of business. Even if this last assertion is not true,
he would have regarded such a statute as posing no worse than a
close case in which ultimately he sided with the Government.
He was perfectly comfortable with the theoretical discussion in
the opinion, including the explicit vitiation of Carter Coal.155
Notice further that this entire matter of Hughes's attitude
towards the case leaves completely unaffected the principal the-
sis of my article. Darby did not represent a major discontinuity
in Commerce Clause doctrine. Indeed, in his comment, Profes-
155. I say "including" because I think the discussion of Carter Coal is included in
Hughes's approving remarks concerning Stone's discussion of "general principles." But
even if I am wrong about that, I believe it is clear that Hughes had no difficulty with the
dispatch of Carter Coal.
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sor Cushman disclaims any contention that Stone's discussion of
"general principles" reflected a major change; rather, he regards
this discussion as "innocuous. 156 Hughes, one of the two most
conservative members of the Court, did not regard the case as a
major doctrinal change; on the contrary, so far as expressions of
doctrine were concerned, he regarded the case as a "suitable
elaboration" of what had come before. At worst, he found that
the reach of the statute brought the case close to the constitu-
tional edge. The other relatively (and generally more) conserva-
tive member of the Court, Roberts, did not find the case particu-
larly troubling at all. The decision advanced the doctrine, no
doubt, but it was not a bolt from the blue.
157
E. Wickard v. Filburn158
Professor Cushman disagrees with my assertion about
Wickard that "[g]iven the apparent effect of farm-consumed
wheat, the case was actually a rather easy one conceptually.'
59
He says, "The intracurial record amply demonstrates that the
Justices did not experience Wickard as an easy case."'160 I agree
completely with that contention; simply from the fact that the
Court ordered reargument of the case, one would infer this to be
true, and the matter is strongly confirmed by the fascinating "in-
tracurial record" that Professor Cushman has skillfully assem-
bled and presented. I did not say that the Justices experienced
the case as easy, for that is plainly not so. I did not even say that
the case was easy, for I said that it "presented a significant prob-
lem of proof." It was only given what I regard as a reasonable
conclusion on the factual issue that I characterized Wickard as a
rather easy case conceptually. But I presented my point rather
loosely, so I will try again.
156. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1048.
157. Professor Cushman gives very little weight to the fact that Justice Douglas's clerk
thought the statute was constitutional and not much to the fact that one of the lower court
decisions on the Act had upheld it. Id. at 1048 n.248. I cited these factors only to support
my view that the outcome of Darby was not revolutionary.
158. 317 U.S. II (1942).
159. Friedman, Sometimes-Bumpy Stream, supra note 2, at 1001.
160. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1049.
161. Friedman, Sometimes-Bumpy Stream, supra note 2, at 1000.
2003] 1091
HeinOnline  -- 55 Ark. L. Rev.  1091 2002-2003
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1055
Once one characterizes the impact of farm-consumed wheat
on the price of wheat as substantial, the conclusion that Con-
gress may include wheat consumed on the farm in an allotment
strikes me as pretty straightforward: Congress may regulate any
matter that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and
if the consumption of wheat on the farm has such an impact, so
be it. I suspect most constitutional law teachers have found, as I
have, that students resist the idea that the power over interstate
commerce can extend to regulate activities confined to a farm,
and similar resistance to that idea may have accounted in part
for the Court's hesitation in the case. But if one considers that
the chief alternative to consumption of home-grown wheat is
probably purchase on the market, the idea becomes easier to ac-
cept. Characterize it as you will; perhaps "rather easy" is too
strong, but in any event the argument did not require daring
leaps from pre-existing law.
Reaching the conclusion that the effect of farm-consumed
wheat was substantial appears to have been difficult for the
Court. As Professor Cushman shows, at one point the Court
nearly remanded for further findings on the matter. Eventually,
the Court decided merely to hold reargument, and Justice Jack-
son especially pondered the underlying question-which re-
mains a contentious one-of the extent to which the Court
should defer to what Congress found, or could have found, with
respect to the extent of the impact of the regulated activity on
commerce. The reargument was limited to the question of
whether the statute "so far as it deals with wheat consumed on
the farm of the producer is within the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce."1 62 I suspect the order was moti-
vated in large part by a desire to get counsel for the Government
to focus more closely on the issue, which had been treated as of
secondary importance in the original briefs. 63 The Government
responded with what appears to me to be a convincing showing
that the effect of farm-consumed wheat was substantial. Justice
Jackson eventually wrote for a unanimous Court, "The record
leaves us in no doubt that Congress may properly have consid-
162. CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 38, at 214.
163. The briefs are reprinted in 39 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 308 (Philip B. Kurland
& Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS].
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ered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown, if wholly
outside the scheme of regulation, would have a substantial effect
in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade
therein at increased prices."' 1 4 I believe that the Court would
have been amply justified in dropping the phrase "that Congress
may properly have considered" from this sentence. But, as Pro-
fessor Cushman confirms, this expression of deference to Con-
gress was hardly unprecedented. 165
Professor Cushman relies greatly on Jackson's extrajudicial
musings, which are fascinating and revealing. I pointed to Jack-
son's tendency to second-guess himself, to revel in the fluidity
of his thinking. And indeed, he reflected this tendency in his
consideration of Wickard, saying, "If a completely baffled mind
can be called an open one, mine is."' 66 Perhaps he became not
only clearer but certain and fixed in his thought by the time the
case was decided, but I doubt it. The more significant point,
though, is that there is no justification for concluding that the
more dramatic assertions by Jackson of what Commerce Clause
doctrine had become represented the views of the Court as to the
doctrine it actually enunciated in Wickard. Professor Cushman
quotes a letter in which, after decision of the case, Jackson said,
"If we were to be brutally frank... I suspect that what we
would say is that in any case where Congress thinks that there is
an effect on intrastate commerce, the Court will accept that
judgment."' 167 But of course Jackson did not contend that the
Court had been brutally frank in this way, and it had not been.
In the actual opinion that Jackson wrote for the Court, the Court
indicated considerable, but not total, deference to Congress.
And in stating the substantive test, it adhered to what had be-
come the standard doctrine of the Commerce Clause, saying that
164. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 129.
165. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1013 n.26 (quoting Stafford,
258 U.S. at 521). Nor, for that matter, was it entirely clear. Earlier in the opinion Jackson
stated that local activity not regarded as commerce may be reached by Congress "if it ex-
erts a substantial effect on interstate commerce." Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. That language
suggests a standard to be judicially applied. Nevertheless, the ultimate holding seems to
rely on deference to Congress.
166. Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Harlan Fiske Stone (May 25, 1942), quoted in
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 38, at 215.
167. Letter from Robert Jackson to Sherman Minton (Dec. 21, 1942) (Robert Jackson
MSS, Box 125, on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), quoted in
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 38, at 221.
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"even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be re-
garded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on inter-
state commerce."'1 68 Professor Cushman says that neither this
language nor the opinion's other references to substantiality
constitutes a requirement of substantiality; 169 he reads it as stat-
ing a sufficient but not necessary condition for the exercise of
federal regulation. That is a logically nice argument, but it
seems overly nice to me; Wickard did not suggest a way that an
effect on commerce that was less than substantial (as determined
however appropriate) could support congressional regulation,
and so far as I know no subsequent Court has ever indicated that
there is such a way.
170
It is easy enough to agree with Justice Jackson's perception
that Congress was no longer effectively restrained by the limita-
tions on the Commerce Clause; once the substantive standard is
articulated in soft terms such as "substantial," and the Court
largely defers to Congress in determining whether the standard
is met, the power cannot be easily confined. Thus, I argued in
my article that the culmination reached by Wickard-Professor
Cushman and I agree that it is a culmination-reflected an equi-
librium that held for more than half a century. I suggested that
the forces pulling the doctrine to that equilibrium still are power-
ful, and so the equilibrium point may remain. But this does not
gainsay another point I made in my article, that by continuing to
speak in terms of a substantial effect on commerce, and by leav-
ing the matter of deference less than absolute, and less than ab-
solutely clear, Wickard left room for maneuver for later justices
inclined to cut back on the doctrine.
168. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
169. Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1052.
170. Though it makes the sufficient-necessary argument, I read Professor Cushman's
book as drawing the distinction I make here-that the substantive test remained substanti-
ality, but the Court deferred to Congress in determining whether that standard was satis-
fied. CUSHMAN, RETHINKING, supra note 38, at 219-20 (stating that in Jackson's opinion
"the sole relevant issue was whether the effect exerted was in the aggregate 'substan-
tial.' ... The record that Jackson and his colleagues had considered utterly inadequate for a
judicial determination of the substantiality of the effect was perfectly adequate for a legis-
lative determination of the substantiality of that effect").
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IV. CONCLUSION
I always learn from Barry Cushman, and in this case I have
learned not only from what he has written but from the extra
thought and extra work his comment has induced. 17 1 In the end,
though, he has challenged the thesis of my initial contribution to
this Symposium little if at all, and indeed I think it is stronger.
So far as the question of how and why the Hughes Court trans-
formed constitutional doctrine is concerned, I have been com-
pelled to rethink numerous matters, but my basic account re-
mains the same: NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.172 was
the big moment, it was not a "stream of commerce" case, and
Hughes's opinion was a natural outgrowth of his previously held
views. His opinion in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 173 remains
something of a mystery, as does Justice Roberts's.
That brings me to one closing thought: I am afraid that,
given my disagreements with Professor Cushman, readers who
believe that there must be an overtly political explanation for the
Supreme Court's decisions in the spring of 1937 must be chor-
tling. If the two of us cannot agree on why Hughes and Roberts
171. 1 do find Professor Cushman's complaint, on which he "hesitate[s] to place too
much emphasis," about my "historical method"--my perceived over-reliance on Supreme
Court opinions, see Cushman, Continuity and Change, supra note 1, at 1054, 1053-to be
completely gratuitous, for several reasons. My initial contribution to this Symposium is, as
Professor Cushman acknowledges, "a relatively brief overview of doctrinal development."
Id. at 1054. Both points are significant. Not only is that article slender as compared to
other work that he and I have both done, but its focus is on the continuity of doctrine, try-
ing principally to demonstrate that it existed rather than to explain what motivated the
Court or individual justices in particular cases. Doctrine is expressed in the opinions of the
Court, and so in that article they are, appropriately I believe, my primary focus. Even so,
my use in that article of other types of sources of the kinds described by Professor Cush-
man is, I think, far more than trivial. In some cases, I rely on such sources directly. In
some, I rely on Cushman's account of such sources, which I assume he regards as not a bad
research method in a work of this nature. And in some, I rely on portions of my 1994 arti-
cle, see Friedman, Switching Time, supra note 4, that were very heavily dependent on such
sources; this includes one passage in which Professor Cushman says that I shrug aside
Hughes's Carter Coal opinion without explanation, but in which actually I refer explicitly
to the argument made in the earlier article. See Friedman, Sometimes-Bumpy Stream, su-
pra note 2, at 995 & nn.56-57. Indeed, Switching Time and its companion piece, Richard
D. Friedman, A Reaffirmation: The Authenticity of the Roberts Memorandum, or Felix the
Non-Forger, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1895 (1994), fully reflect the kind of research Professor
Cushman recommends, as he must know.
End of gripe. Back to high-minded academic civility.
172. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
173. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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acted as they did, it apparently makes more likely the hypothesis
that political pressure accounted for their behavior. But that
would be the wrong inference. The strongest reason for reject-
ing the overt political explanation is that there is no support for
it other than a brief and not unprecedented flurry of liberal deci-
sions while the Court-packing plan was pending. Trying to re-
construct the thought processes of independent-minded Justices
several decades after the fact is not an easy task. Even if, as is
possible, we never have a full and fully persuasive account, that
would not mean that Hughes and Roberts adopted the positions
they did because of political pressure.
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